The Man Who Hoped Too Much

John Prados

December 06, 2006

John Prados is a senior fellow of the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. His current book is Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Ivan R. Dee Publisher). 

Robert M. Gates was up on Capitol Hill yesterday. Unlike the last time, 1991, when he stood for director of central intelligence, there were no opposing witnesses, no detailed staff inquiries, no controversy, no opposition majority in the Congress. Only one senator—Michigan’s Carl Levin—went into the Iran-Contra affair—and only after lunch when most of the Senate Armed Services Committee had left. The committee wrapped up its public hearing three-quarters of an hour later, departing for an executive session where they could continue behind closed doors. Everything was so smooth. The committee may have voted on the Gates nomination to become Secretary of Defense to succeed Donald Rumsfeld as soon as last night, and very likely the entire confirmation exercise will be over shortly, maybe today.

The secretary-designate, properly respectful, said many of the right things. Iraq is the most important challenge facing America today, Gates opined. No, we are not winning there. Yes, there are many others and he will do his best to address as many of them as possible. All options will be on the table. Gates promised to consult anyone who has something relevant to say, and repeatedly referred to getting the low down from U.S. military commanders. Attack on Iran “should be an absolutely last resort.” He does not favor an attack on Syria, which could have incalculable effects across the Middle East. Neither the 9/11 nor the Iraq war resolutions, as Gates understands them, convey the authority for military action against either country. He is highly suspicious of Pentagon encroachments on U.S. intelligence missions during the Rumsfeld era, and indeed he referred specifically to the inability of the director of national intelligence to carry out his assigned role due to the fact he couldn’t fire any of his agency directors—most of whom belong to the Pentagon. Gates will be an independent man. “I don’t owe anybody anything, and I came here to do the best I can,” he declared.
    
All of this sounded pretty good. What’s not to like? Bob Gates has long had the reputation of a canny player and he showed that quality again at his confirmation hearing. He was introduced to Armed Services by three former senators, one a Republican patriarch, Bob Dole of Kansas, Gates’s birthplace; another the conductor of those controversial 1991 intelligence hearings, David Boren, along with a written assist from an Armed Services Committee great, Georgia’s Sam Nunn. Gates promised each questioner he would follow up on whatever major concern had been raised, and offered little in the way of detailed programmatic promises on the argument that he lacks knowledge of the specifics and so far has focused simply on getting confirmed. Fair enough. But for all that, the hearings revealed underlying aspects of this situation that ought to be of concern to all Americans.

On change in Iraq, don’t look for it here. Gates’s answers at yesterday’s hearing to the many senators who were consumed with the Iraq mess demonstrated little of the independence to which the nominee laid claim. He refused to characterize events in that tragic land as a civil war. He hid behind the need to consult to avoid discussing strategies, but Gates’s affirmation that the U.S. will have to have some presence in Iraq for a very long time implicitly rejected the withdrawal option. Just forget about “timetables.” Token withdrawals seemed a little more attractive—Gates responded positively to mention of the options in the recently-leaked swan song memo crafted by predecessor Rumsfeld. The nominee even spoke of “dramatically smaller forces.” That was in the framework of the new panacea of huge increases in U.S. military advisers attached to the Iraqi army. But Gates’s acceptance of President Bush’s definition of the mission in Iraq—a nation that can sustain itself, govern itself, and protect itself—conditions not attainable in the foreseeable future—ensures this war cannot end anytime soon. Parenthetically it should be noted that this mission constitutes exactly what Bush has offered as the definition of “victory” in Iraq.

Bob Gates acknowledges that a solution in Iraq must be political, not military, but gives little sense of a path from here to there. There is no dialogue among Iraqi sectarian or ethnic groups, while there is a very real sense of factions waiting for the fall for a chance to grab the spoils. None of the little that has been accomplished by the Iraqi government has come easily, and its ability to accomplish any more is palpably diminishing every day. A political solution under these conditions is illusory, yet the Bush mission requires far more than that, in fact demanding the transformation of this failed state—created by the Bush people themselves—into a viable nation. 
    
The prospective secretary of defense has some inkling of potential consequences, as befits the professional intelligence analyst that Gates has long been. He promised Rhode Island Sen. Jack Reed to try and think through a way out if American forces become trapped in a situation of disintegrating Iraqi political authority overwhelmed by ethnic cleansing. Unfortunately the latest strategic panacea—that notion of the large American advisory group submerged among Iraqis, plus much smaller combat forces—will greatly reduce U.S. combat capabilities for that very scenario. It will be difficult to square that circle.

As for the independence of Secretary Gates within the Bush administration, that may turn out to be only a comforting fiction. Gates acknowledged—twice—that the president makes the decisions. Gates may give his best advice, but George W. Bush has always been loathe to take advice against his own prejudices and is today again in the process of demonstrating that trait once more.
    
All of this was perfectly predictable. Why does Robert Gates put himself out for this? He told the committee he offers himself because the nation asks. He also proposes a more philosophical vision. His goals, Gates explained, are twofold: To find a path forward to achieve the goal of a sustainable state in Iraq, while at home forging the elements of a (bipartisan) national consensus on the "war" against terror. Gates believes such a bipartisan approach to be “one of our great reasons for success” in the Cold War and a similar consensus is necessary for a generational conflict like the present one. That would be the real achievement. I, for one, came away with the sense that Robert Gates would acquiesce in what is necessary for the first purpose if he could attain the second. Unfortunately Mr. Gates will work for a president whose notion of bipartisanship is that other parties should line up behind him. And the president makes the decisions.