Tell Bolton To Bolt

Scott T. Paul

September 06, 2006

Scott T. Paul is campaigns manager for Citizens for Global Solutions.

When John Bolton’s nomination as United Nations ambassador returns to the Senate this week, senators face a simple but important choice: roll over or stand up to the failed Bush foreign policy.

Bolton has been an unmitigated disaster at the U.N. and senators know it. In his major speech at the Brookings Institution last month challenging Bush administration unilateralism, Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., said, “If I actually believe what I have said—and I do—then there appears to be at least in your mind some disconnect in how I could support Mr. Bolton. And I think that’s a fair question.”

A year ago, in view of Bolton’s statements denigrating the U.N., international law and multilateralism, it might have been a fair question. Now, after a year of failure at the U.N., it is a matter of fact. Bolton’s arrogance and heavy-handedness have further isolated the United States and undermined U.S. foreign policy.

As the U.S. asks for international help confronting Iran and North Korea, stopping genocide in Darfur, building peace in the Middle East and defeating terrorism, we need a proven coalition-builder who can rally the international community to advance its foreign policy goals. A year into his tenure, Bolton has done little to bring U.S. allies together—and much to unite adversaries against him. One foreign envoy with close ties to the Bush administration told The New York Times:

“My initial feeling was, let’s see if we can work with him, and I have done some things to push for consensus on issues that were not easy for my country…but all he gives us…is, ‘It doesn’t matter, whatever you do is insufficient,’ ” he said. “He’s lost me as an ally now, and that’s what many other ambassadors who consider themselves friends of the U.S. are saying.”

Bolton started losing allies from Day One. His first task upon arrival in New York was to negotiate an agreement that was meant to review progress on achieving the Millennium Development Goals—a set of standards for global human well-being to be met by 2015—and refocus the United Nations to make it more relevant to the challenges of the 21st century. In an unprecedented move, Bolton proposed more than 750 amendments to the draft agreement, including the elimination of all 14 references to the goals. Not surprisingly, other countries, outraged by Bolton’s approach, proceeded to strip the text of U.S.-backed provisions that Bolton’s predecessor, acting-Ambassador Anne Patterson, fought hard to include. The result was a document that contained no definition of terrorism, no agreement on nonproliferation and watered-down sections on improving the U.N.’s much-maligned management practices and human rights machinery.

Later in the year, Bolton further botched efforts to follow-up on these last two fronts. Of at least 30 negotiating sessions on establishing a new U.N. Human Rights Council to replace the discredited Commission on Human Rights, Bolton attended one. He then suggested that the permanent five members of the Security Council—including habitual human rights abusers China and Russia—be automatically granted seats on the council. Then, in eleventh-hour talks with the president of the General Assembly, he neglected to even mention the U.S.’s top priorities for the council.

Just days later, Bolton announced that despite these less-than-Herculean efforts, the U.S. would vote against the establishment of the council. Swiss Ambassador Peter Mauer summed up the feeling in New York when he called Bolton’s approach “intransigent and maximalist.”

Yet, Bolton’s biggest failure was on the issue he claims is nearest to his heart: Making the U.N. more effective and efficient. Bolton made passing a set of management reforms proposed by Secretary General Kofi Annan the highest priority of his term.

For a smart and effective ambassador, passing these reforms, like incorporating U.S. priorities in a Human Rights Council, is mission possible.

But Bolton employed heavy-handed tactics that alienated the countries he needed to win over. In December, he forced through a six-month cap on the U.N. budget; by April, the cap had become Bolton’s standing, unspoken threat to shut down the U.N. if reforms were not adopted. Meanwhile, instead of speaking about what countries stand to gain from reform, Bolton regularly trashed the U.N., deriding incremental reform progress and choosing potshots over constructive criticism. Bolton’s backers like to suggest that he is pounding other countries into submission; yet, his approach only rallied them together against the U.S. and against reform.

He has also compromised U.S. goals on Darfur, North Korea, Lebanon and Iran. And if these blunders earn Bolton straight Ds on his first-year report card, his confrontational rhetoric and anti-U.N. bluster—which earn him high marks from conservative pundits— have virtually assured him Fs across the board for the foreseeable future by alienating key negotiating partners and allies. Over 30 ambassadors working on the U.S.’s side on U.N. reform have raised issues with Bolton’s approach. Needless to say, those on the other side have an even less favorable view.

Bolton’s record is a tale of missed opportunities and deteriorating relationships. Some senators considering the Bolton nomination will raise questions about Bolton’s management practices, his aggressive diplomatic style, and the supposed need for continuity in the U.N. ambassadorship, but these are mere distractions. Bolton is the standard-bearer of arrogance, unilateralism and ineffectiveness in the Bush administration’s foreign policy. For Democrats and moderate Republicans, there will be no better opportunity to stand up and be counted.