Loose Nukes For India

David Culp and Aaron Scherb

April 05, 2006

David Culp has worked on nuclear disarmament issues for nearly 20 years on Capitol Hill. Aaron Scherb, a Haverford College graduate, works on disarmament issues and has focused his work on the U.S.-India nuclear deal.

When President George W. Bush arrived in New Delhi in March, India had the capacity to produce six to 10 nuclear weapons per year. Under the nuclear agreement reached before the president departed, India would have the capacity to produce nearly 50 nuclear weapons per year.

But the president still needs Congress to approve the deal. Current U.S. law and international regulations prevent countries from exporting nuclear technology to India, because the South Asian nation does not allow international inspections of its nuclear program. The Bush administration is attempting to undermine these existing nonproliferation rules, which the U.S. has worked for years to strengthen, to provide India with nuclear technology and fuel. Today, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice goes to Capitol Hill to ask Congress to weaken the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to allow an exception to the prohibition on exporting nuclear technologies to countries that have not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Such an exception would weaken global nonproliferation efforts and only make potential future standoffs with Iran or Pakistan more tense. The Atomic Energy Act is a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, the ultimate weapons of mass destruction. Rather than loosening regulations, the U.S. should be tightening restrictions on the export of technology necessary to produce nuclear bombs. Congress should not exempt India from nonproliferation regulations that would undermine the NPT.

This international agreement, endorsed by 188 nations including the U.S., bans the export of nuclear technology to countries that don’t agree to international inspections of their nuclear programs. The agreement is a cornerstone of global efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. India has refused to sign the NPT and has already built an estimated 100 nuclear weapons. In fact, India diverted U.S. nuclear material intended for civilian purposes for its 1974 nuclear test. The most recent Indian nuclear weapons test was in 1998.

Now the Bush administration wants to reward India for this behavior by providing the South Asian nation with nuclear technology and fuel. In exchange, India will allow 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors to face international inspections. Six of these nuclear reactors are already due to come under international inspections in 2014. In addition, the tentative agreement would leave uncertain whether future Indian nuclear reactors will face international inspections. More troubling, India’s fast-breeder reactors, which produce the most bomb-making material, will not face international inspections.

At the same time, the Bush administration is criticizing Iran (an NPT signatory) for developing similar nuclear technology. While these two countries have nuclear programs that are at very different stages, the U.S. push for this deal undermines its credibility toward Iran in the international community.

But this debate is not just about double standards. Creating an Indian exception to the NPT sets a dangerous precedent and could ultimately destroy the NPT. Michael Krepon, a former U.S. government disarmament expert who now works at the Stimson Center, wrote recently: “One key assumption behind the deal is especially important—that the relaxation of nuclear export controls can be confined to India alone. If this assumption is wrong, downside proliferation risks will be open-ended.” The passage of this deal would tacitly encourage other countries to make similar bilateral nuclear agreements and snub international rules and regulations.

What happens if Pakistan, a country with which India has had several wars and nearly had a nuclear war in 2001, interprets this deal as an aggressive move? What would stop Pakistan from reaching a similar nuclear arrangement with China? This deal could deteriorate relatively stable relations between India and Pakistan and spur a nuclear arms race.

The administration has cited two main justifications for making this deal with India. First, with a population of more than 1 billion people, India has burgeoning energy needs. Providing India with technology to assist its energy production is a legitimate goal, but the U.S. can assist India’s energy needs without bolstering its nuclear weapons production by up to 500 percent. The U.S. could be providing technology and funding for alternative energy sources, for example.

Second, the deal’s proponents claim that it will bring India into the NPT without actually signing it. However, making deals like this actually encourages countries to withdraw from the NPT. If India wants nuclear technology, it should agree to inspections for all of its nuclear reactors. India should have to play by the NPT rules. As soon as one exception is made, other U.S. allies will want waivers as well.

While India is an emerging partner of the U.S., the administration should be cautious not to proliferate nuclear technology, even to democracies. In the past, democratic states have been a source of nuclear proliferation. South Africa and Switzerland, both of which are democracies, had nuclear technology that was obtained by the A.Q. Khan network, a Pakistan-based group which acquired nuclear technology and sold it to “rogue” states in the 1990s. The current Indian administration is a trustworthy partner of the United States, but the U.S. cannot predict the views of future elected officials in India and what they will do with its increased nuclear weapons arsenal.

The proposed U.S.-India nuclear deal will take months for Congress to scrutinize. This issue has been less partisan than most issues on Capitol Hill, and many members of Congress from both parties have expressed reservations about the deal. Two congressional committees will hold hearings on this issue today and will likely hold future fact-finding sessions.

While strong U.S.-India ties are important, the means with which the Bush administration seeks to achieve this end are dangerous. Congress should not exempt India from U.S. and international nonproliferation regulations. In the words of former President Jimmy Carter in The Washington Post on March 29, 2006, “The proposed nuclear deal with India is just one more step in opening a Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation.”