Iraqi Resistance and Jan. 30

December 06, 2004

The seven weeks or so between now and Jan. 30—the scheduled date for the elections in Iraq—is by far the most critical period for the region since the start of the war itself. What happens over that period will determine whether Iraq moves toward civil war or some sort of stability. The Bush administration has opted for the former, by demanding elections come what may.

A bit of reality crept into the major media today. The Post, in a long dispatch on the shape of the resistance post-Fallujah, finally puts the emphasis (nearly) on the right place: that the Iraqi resistance is not made up of Islamist crazies or foreign Al Qaeda types, but home-grown Baathists. Says the Post :

One of the key aspects of the insurgency that U.S. commanders are watching closely is the extent of cooperation between former Baath Party members and radical Islamic fighters. The Baathists remain the dominant opposition group, according to military analysts, but signs of them entering loose tactical alliances with more radical elements have been evident for months.

Such alliances are suspected of underlying at least some of the recent surge of violence in Mosul, Iraq's third-largest city, where the police force collapsed under attack last month. Some U.S. officers worry about Mosul, or sections of it, possibly becoming a new insurgent stronghold, although the city's greater size and prosperity make it less susceptible than Fallujah was.

In some other Sunni areas, U.S. intelligence analysts have seen indications lately of Baathists reconsidering partnerships with radical Islamic elements.

"They're assessing their options," DeFreitas said.

The Baathist insurgency is centered on a number of key leaders, U.S. officers say, and still lacks the scope of a popular Sunni resistance. But the officers warned that growing political alienation could lead to a broadening of the insurgency.

This is really important stuff. Forget all the neocon nonsense about jihadists. The Baath is the core of the resistance. But even the Post gets it slightly wrong. What they ought to say is that the resistance is not pro-Saddam, but mostly Iraq nationalists who made up the core of the Baath, and who are supported by or linked to other Arab nationalists in surrounding countries, through tribal connections. There are two major Sunni tribes whose leaders are emerging as leaders of the resistance. These are precisely the groups that ought to be brought into a dialogue over the future of Iraq, and the shape of peace is a simple equation: If you guys declare a truce, lay down your arms, and get an important share of power, then the United States will leave Iraq.

But the Bush-Sistani axis will here none of it. More of this in my next dispatch.