William Fisher has managed economic development programs in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia for the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development. He served in the international affairs area in the administration of President John F. Kennedy.
If Iran should decide to come to the negotiating table over its nuclear program, it will be doing so as the U.S. steps up its “soft power” efforts to “democratize” the country. But questions remain about the content and effectiveness of such programs, the impact they will have on negotiations, and the Bush administration’s commitment to a pro-democracy agenda that many experts see as nothing more than a euphemism for regime change.
Condoleezza Rice has asked Congress for $75 million to implement an ambitious three-pronged strategy for Iran. It centers on expanding independent radio and television, with some $50 million allocated to establishing round-the-clock, Farsi-language television in tandem with current foreign nonstop radio broadcasts. Concurrently, the U.S. would fund pro-democracy groups, dissident political parties, labor unions and human rights organizations. The final step would be boosting cultural and education fellowships and exchanges to help Iranian students and scholars to enroll in U.S. universities.
But even assuming the best of intentions, the U.S. government cannot “empower civil society”—without landing the recipients in jail. Human rights advocate Shirin Ebadi—the first Muslim woman and first Iranian to win the Nobel Peace Prize—was asked in a “PBS NewsHour” interview whether the Bush administration’s $75 million program would be useful to her and those who are engaged democracy-building from inside Iranian society.
“No, I don't think that it benefits me or people like me, because whoever speaks about democracy in Iran will be accused of having been paid by the United States,” Ebadi said.
The potential of soft-power initiatives must be measured against the backdrop of what many in Iran (and elsewhere) see as the hypocrisies and contradictions of U.S. foreign policy. America’s credibility as the world's champion of human rights has been diminished by policies such as the invasion of Iraq, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, extraordinary rendition, excessive secrecy and blind favoritism of Israel. And— as evidenced by its dealings with countries like Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia—the Bush administration has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to abandon its democracy agenda in favor of recruiting partners for the "global war on terror" and cultivating cozy relationships with energy-rich countries, even if they are ruled by dictators.
Another obstacle is that the State Department is tooling up for a renaissance of “public diplomacy” from a baseline of almost zero in Iran. After the 1978 Islamic Revolution and the end of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations, the U.S. effectively ignored the country. Before the nuclear issue exploded onto the world stage, there was only limited support for aid to émigré groups by conservative Republican lawmakers such as Pennsylvania Sen. Rick Santorum, and anti-Iran organizations such as the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).
But their efforts only succeeded in extracting a paltry $3 million from Congress. Of that, $1 million was granted to a single U.S.-based non-governmental organization, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, to document human rights violations since the 1979 revolution.
Today, the State Department’s vision for Iran's immediate future is far more ambitious. Realistically, however, the U.S. government simply cannot implement major components of this strategy.
Current law would have to be changed to allow direct support for labor unions, opposition political parties and dissident NGOs within Iran. More important, such support would place its recipients at grave risk.
The U.S. can work to increase the number of Iranian students enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities, but there is no U.S. embassy in Tehran, which means prospective students have to travel to locations outside Iran in order to apply for U.S. visas. And while increasing the number of visiting students is a time-tested and successful effort, it is a very long-term proposition.
So, if many of the more ambitious visions of what the State Department can do are off the table, what’s left is broadcasting—which is why two-thirds of the $75 million request will be spent to increase Farsi-language television and radio broadcasting into Iran. VOA would share roughly $30 million of the emergency funding with Radio Farda, a joint effort of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America.
This month, VOA’S popular Persian-language Mizegerdi ba Shoma (Roundtable With You”) program will expand to a new daily schedule, broadcasting for one hour each day. The radio-TV simulcast has been broadcast weekly for 90 minutes for nearly a decade.
VOA also broadcasts daily half-hour satellite TV news programs. Although it is illegal to own a satellite dish in Iran, an estimated 15 million Iranians are believed to have access to satellite TV. But because of the difficulty of surveying the Iranian public, U.S. officials do not know how many actually tune in.
Experts say the impact has been mixed. “I think that public diplomacy efforts in Iran are bound to fail unless our policies drastically change,” says John Brown, a former foreign service officer and now a professor of public diplomacy at Georgetown University. “After all, Persians weren't exactly born yesterday and pop songs or even ‘serious’ discussions about values on the air are not going to change people's mindsets.
“We should have started ages ago,” he says. “Now we’re playing catch-up."
Lionel Beehner, a writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, is also skeptical. “The surveys I see show that most Iranians, particularly youth, who make up a bulk of the country, are pretty pro-America already,” albeit not pro-U.S. foreign policy, he says. “A growing number have access to satellite TV. This is not Poland circa 1980.”
Resistance to U.S. pro-democracy offers from within Iran needs to be factored into this equation. Ebadi’s views echo those of many other Iranian civil society activists who worry that the proposed U.S. initiative will simply be used by the Islamic Republic as a pretense for intensifying its repressive approach toward civil society organizations.
In funding pro-democracy groups abroad or in Iran, “you endanger those you're trying to help,” says Beehner.
Beyond that, however, the reality of public diplomacy—whether through broadcasting, cultural exchanges or support for dissident groups—is that it cannot be turned on and off. It was never intended to be a quick fix. Even in the best cases, its success depends on a consistent effort over an extended period.
The U.S. has failed to mount that kind of effort, and that failure does not bode well for the prospect of “winning hearts and minds” in Iran any time soon.
