Jerome Armstrong runs the popular blog MyDD—covering campaigns, elections and world affairs—with Chris Bowers.
A win by Paul Hackett was always a longshot. Scratch that. Winning the Ohio 2nd, a district that went 64-36 for Bush in 2004, seemed more of a punchline than a longshot. Yet, in closing a yawing gap in one of the reddest places in the country, Democrats have accomplished something significant. Indeed, the National Journal 's Charlie Cook called the narrow 52-48 margin of victory for the Republican "a very serious warning sign for Ohio Republicans that something is very, very wrong."
The partisan configuration of the district was why, a few months back, the race was written off by the Democratic Party organizations in D.C., as a hopeless cause. By way of contrast, the online activists—or 'the netroots"—of the Democratic Party saw a chance to rejoin the fight with the Republicans. Their turf, our turf, so what— it's time to engage again was the attitude. Maybe the conventional wisdom of the D.C. Democrats was true, and Hackett didn't have a chance, but that didn't matter. For those of us working to create a reform movement within the Democratic Party to regain a 50-state footing, the opportunity was what mattered.
Iraq war veteran Paul Hackett also happens to be the sort of candidate who appeals to the netroots. Here he is, in one of the reddest of the red House districts in the nation, and when he's asked about the prospects of gay marriage, he says: "Gay marriage—who the hell cares? If you're gay you're gay—more power to you. What you want is to be treated fairly by the law and any American who doesn't think that should be the case is, frankly, un-American." The Cincinnati Post , in their endorsement, lauded Hackett as a "Libertarian Democrat... We like Hackett's candor. We're impressed with the freshness of his ideas. We believe his experience shows him to be someone who is action-oriented." Indeed.
Hackett, like a lot of Democratic candidates who have been embraced by the netroots, speaks the truth, regardless of the circumstances, and doesn't back down when attacked for having spoken it.
Paul Hackett’s success means we can expect more of what Howard Dean first tapped into—the growing movement within the Democratic Party willing to take the Republicans head on about the direction of this nation. While the Republicans would turn us back to a day where everyone is on their own, the Democrats offer a vision of the world that acknowledges we are all in this together. The implications of the netroots embrace of Paul Hackett should be clear to the Democratic organizations and politicians that represent us: run as a person that means what he or she says, and we will go to the mat with you—taking it to the Republicans on their turf if need be. If the Democrats can do this across the nation in 2006, we will win back the majority in Congress.
Paul Hackett was the first step in resuscitating the party after the 2004 defeat. The special election in California’s 48th congressional district is up next in a couple of months. And in 2006, there will be 232 Republican seats in the House up for re-election, and not a single one should be left uncontested, or only lightly challenged.
To make this happen, the Democratic organization that runs the congressional races—the DCCC—and the netroots activists will need to work in tandem. In the 2004 cycle, we had a couple of races where the strategy of taking it to the Republicans in their backyard worked well. Richard Morrison against Tom DeLay in the Texas 22nd is one example, and Stan Matsunaka against Marilyn Musgrave in the Colorado Fourth District as another. Perhaps the DCCC—as they argue—is not suited to field every House race, but they do have the resources and funds to jump on board with one that "gets hot" from netroots and grassroots activism, like they finally did for Hackett. And it makes financial and electoral sense to challenge every Republican incumbent. There's also leverage here. If Republicans think there's a chance they could be “Hacketted” and the DCCC will swoop in, it will spread their resources thinner as they spend more time of defense. Money spent on “hopeless” candidates is not money wasted, it's leverage gained.
Walter Ludwig's Project 90—which recruits and supports House candidates in Republican districts—found that, "Between 2000-2004, Democrats failed to compete or barely challenge in over a quarter of U.S. House races, and the Republican incumbents in those districts contributed over $60M to their colleagues in closer races."
The Ohio 2nd District was one of those on Project 90's list. Its Congressman, Republican Representative Portman, used the time he didn't have to spend campaigning to raise over $1.3 million for other Republicans running in competitive races.
This time around, the netroots took a Marine that didn’t have a chance in hell of winning and made the Republicans in D.C. so scared that they were forced to drop $500,000 on the race. The netroots also forced the Republican Schmidt to blow through her entire campaign fund, which is another $700,000 that won’t be going to other Republican candidates in 2006. Meanwhile, the DCCC spent a little over $100,000. That’s more than $1 million the Republicans will now not have to spend in 2006. Challenging every seat will not be the end all for Democrats to win, but it is a key strategic component.
There's another lesson here— that of rural America. The reason Paul Hackett fell just short was because of the Republican strongholds in the suburbs of Cincinnati. The suburban counties of Claremont and Warren—counties targeted by Democratic strategists as “winnable”—proved to be solidly Republican. However, Hackett won rural counties in Ohio counties like Brown, Adams, Scioto and Pike—96 percent white, lower-income, higher-unemployment counties that Democrats have forgotten and the Republicans have shafted.
Democrats haven't shown up in these places for years, so in 2004, Bush beat Kerry by 28 percent in Brown, but Hackett won by 28 percent in 2005; Bush beat Kerry by 28 percent in Adams, where Hackett won by 4 percent; Bush beat Kerry in Scioto by 4 percent; where Hackett won by 30 percent; Bush beat Kerry in Pike by 4 percent; where Hackett won by 26 percent.
Rural America is not sold on the socially extremist agenda of Republicans to outlaw abortion, intimidate the teaching of science and allow the government to intrude into the personal lives of its citizens. If they were, then the president of the Greater Cincinnati "Right to Life" group, Republican Jean Schmidt, would have swept these rural Ohio counties. Rural America is ready to become Democratic again. For Democrats, going after this weakest link of the Republican majority is the path to the congressional majority in 2006 and the presidency in 2008.
Paul Hackett didn't win, and to some that may mean everything. However, choosing not to challenge Republicans in every district, even seemingly hopeless ones, has important ramifications on winning in swing-district races. If we do not start contesting every district, we will not become a national party again. With the rapidly growing ability of the netroots to recruit and support Democratic candidates in long-shot contests, we can boost these candidates’ chances. With a little help from Democrats in D.C., we can make a national Democratic Party a reality for 2006. If we are going to truly challenge Republicans about the direction of our country, we don't have another day, or another election, to waste. Let's run 232 Hackett-like operations against the Republicans in the elections of 2006, and plenty of swing-district wins will walk out of the wilderness on Election Day.
